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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

~HF.

STATF.: OF UTAH

STATE OF U'!'AH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

.

-v-

Case No. 1834<'

SANnRA J. TALBOT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with manslaughter, a seconddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code

Ann.,~

(1953), as amenaea, for the homicine of Brandon

76-5-205
~len

Talbot on

lluly 11, 19Al.
DISPOSITION IN

THE

LOWER COURT

Appellant was convicted Novernber 19, 19Rl of
manslaughter in a jury trial before the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen, Judge, presiding in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah.

On February 26,

1982, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not

less than one year nor more than fifteen years in prison.
R.EL I

EF SOUGHT ON

APP F.AL

Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's
conviction and sentence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATF.:MENT OF THR FACTS

Appellant was tried on November lA-19, 1981 for the
homicide of Brandon Glen Talbot, appellant's IR-month-old son.
When Brandon was four months old, he was
hospitalized at Utah valley Hospital on March 15,

1~80

and was

treated by Dr. Brent Griffin, a pediatrician, for "failure to
-

thrive," a term which refers to_._.an inadequate weight gain or
below normal growth in a young child (State's Exhibit 9: T.
27).

Dr. r,riffin suspected that appellant was not providing

adequate care for Brandon and he requested the assistance of·
the Utah nivision of Family Services, which investigated the
case (State's Exhibit q: T. 36).

Brandon gained weight during

his three-week hospital stay and was then released to
appellant's custody (State's Exhibit

~).

The Division of

Family Services, with the assistance of police officers,
removed Brandon from appellant's custody because of neglect
and placed him in a foster home (State's Exhibit 9: T. lOn).
Rrandon remained in the foster home from April lR, 1980 until
April 30, 1981,· when he was returned to appellant's

cus~ody

(T. 97, 100: State's Exhibit 9).
On July 11, 1981, appellant was at her Provo, Utah
home when Brandon awoke at 10:30 a.m. (T. 92: State's Exhibit
9).

Appellant had prohlems with Brandon because he was

playing in the toilet ana throwing temper tantrums, so she
placed Brandon back in bed (T. 92: State's Exhibit 9).
-?.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Appellant's husband, Rodney Talbot, left the apartment for his
job around 10 a.m., leaving appellant with sole custody of
Brandon ( T. 112 ; State ' s Ex h ib i t 9 ) •
When Brandon woke up about 1 p.m., appellant placed
him in a kitchen chair and gave him a piece of toast ( T. _en,
112; State's Exhibit 9).

Because Rrandon was having another

temper tantrum, appellant slapped him (T. <n, 112; State's
Exhibit 9).

Brandon's "head hi-t pretty hard on the table" ( T.

93, 112; State's Exhibit 9).

Appellant was alarmed at how

hard she slapped him, she hugged him and said she would not do
it again (T.

9~,

112; State's Exhibit 9).

adjusting the television, she heard

~ranaon

While appellant was
choking and saw

him fall out of the chair (T. 93, 112; State's Exhibit 9).
Appellant pie ked Brandon up and ran to a neighbor's home to
get transportation to Utah Valley Hospital, where they arrived
at about 1:30 p.m. (T. lOR, 113; State's Exhibit 9).
On arrival at the hospital, Brandon had breathing
difficulties and had a rapid heart rate (T. 17, 27).

Dr.

Robert Gray, an emergency room physician, suctioned multiple
pieces of food and vomit from Brandon's throat and placed an
endotrachial tube into the trachea to artificially resuscitate
the child (T. 17, 28).

Phenobarbital was administered to help

control the seizures Brandon was having (T. 2R).

nr. r,ray

became concerned about the head injuries because Rrandon did
not begin normal breathing after his throat was cleared (T.
18).

The normal level of acid in Brandon's blood indicated
-3-
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that suffocation on food was not the cause of Brandon's
breathing problems (T. 18).

Dr. Gray had not ruled out child

abuse as the cause of the breathing problems (T. 21).

The

history from appellant that the child was sitting in a chair,
was eating, fell from the chair, vomited and quit breathing
was inconsistent with the physical examination of Brandon, who
had new, acute head bruises and several older bruises (T. 24).
Dr. Gray could not say whether it was likely that the head
injuries could be caused by a fall from a chair (T. 25).
Recause Brandon had multiple head bruises, which could cause
vomiting, Dr. Gray requested the assistance of nr. Brent
Griffin, a pediatrician, and Dr. John Andrews, a neurologist
(T. 19-20).

nr. Brent Griffin had treated Brandon on March 5,
1980 for "failure to thrive"1 the child was not gaining weight

or growing normally (T. 271 State's Exhibit 9).

Dr. Griffin

was surprised by the blood gas tests because the acid content
was at a normal level, indicating that choking on food was not
the cause of Brandon's breathing problems (T. 34-3S).

nr.

Griffin saw several bruises on Brandon's forehead and back,
which were of different colors, indicating that they were of
various ages (T. 35).

He was also concerned with child abuse

because it is uncommon for a child to have multiple bruises,
especially an !A-month-old child with multiple bruises on the
back (T. 36-37).

It is very unlikely that a child could

sustain a severe brain injury from a fall off a chair (T. 38).
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Griffin could not explain the severe brain injury from the
history that appellant had given and he would be surprised if
the injury had been caused by a fall from a chair to a tile
floor CT. 39-40).
Brandon had highly elevated pressure inside his head
the night after his hospital admission and on July 13, 1981 at
ahout_

i

a.m., Dr. r,riffin pronounced Brandon dead

(~.

39-4n).

Dr. Griffin believed he died from severe intercranial swelling
and pressure on the brain from an injury caused by a blow or
blows to Brandon's head (T. 40).

Dr. r,riffin considered a

number of possible causes of the brain injury, including
accident, but a blow or something striking his head caused
Brandon's death (T. 43-44).
Dr. John Andrews made a neurological examination of
Brandon from 4:3n to 5:30 p.m. CT. 4R).

Brandon was in a

semicomatose state, not fully alert with abnormal posturing
and with involuntary movements (T. 48).

Also present were

abnormal eye movements and decorticate and decerebrate
(different degrees) levels of severe and considerable brain
damage, "even down into the region of the vital centers of the
brain in the hrain stem region, down low in the medulla pons
and midbrain area" (T. 48-49).
Dr. Andrews believed the injuries were caused by a
blow to the head because of intercranial pressure, swelling
where the optic nerve joins the back of the eye, hemorrhages
in the eyes, and bruises of various colors (T. 50).

Dr.
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Andrews rejected choking or suffocation on food as an
explanation for the severe injuries because the acid content
in Brandon's blood was normal and because the severity of the
brain injury was inconsistent with suffocation (T. 52).

The

history given by appellant did not explain the severity of the
brain damage and the subsequent course of Brandon's health (T.
53). -He staten that a fall from a chair may account for one
of the bruises, but not for multiple bruises and that a fall
from a chair would be unlikely to cause Brandon's injury (T.
57).

Dr. Andrews did not rule out "battered child
syndrome 11 l (T. 5!l-fi0) because of the bruises on the head,
especially the left temple bruise (T.

~6),

bruises on the

child's back (T. 56), "a scab or a bruise or cut, abrasion" on
the child's penis (T. S6), several scattered bruises and
diaper rash on the buttocks (T. 5fi-57), and because of the
discrepancies between the medical examination of Brandon and
the history given by aopellant (T. 59-60).

He could not rule

out with medical certainty that accident was the cause of the
brain injury (T. 62-63).

l"Rattered Child Syndrome" is a term by which
children are injured other than by accident. State v. Loss,
204 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1Q73)1 United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d
527 (5th Cir. 1981). As explained in State v. Per1man, 230
S.E.2d 802 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), it indicates that "the group
of signs or symptoms they observed precludes the notion that
the injuries were self-inflicted or inflicted by other than
the intentional violence of another."
-fiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Dr. John Wallace Graham, a medical examiner for the
State of Utah, performed an autopsy on Brandon on July 13,
1981 (T. 72).

Dr. nraham's external and internal examination

of Brandon revealed that the primary cause of death was a very
large bruise over the left top of the head which caused a
bilateral subdural hematorna and severe brain swelling (T.
74-75, 78).

The child's injuries were not consistent with

Brandon's falling from one of the chairs because the fatal
internal injury was too severe (T. 76).

Brandon would have

had to fall from a considerably greater height than a chair to
sustain a severe head injury (T. 76).
His conclusion was that a solid object struck
Brandon's head or that the head had been banged against a
solid object (T. 76).

nr. Graham ruled out accident entirely

as a cause of Brandon's injuries (T. Rl).

He agreed that an

accident may have caused soMe of the bruises, but there were
too many injuries of differinq ages to consider an accident as
the cause of the fatal injury, which was extremely severe (T.
80-81).

He stated that Brandon's injuries were consistent

with "Battered Child Syndrome" because there were bruises on
various parts of Brandon's boay, there were injuries of
various ages, and the injuries were not explained adequately
and consistently with those caused by accidents (T. 83).
on July 14, 1981, neorge Pierpont, a Provo City
police officer, met appellant and her husband at their
apartment (T.

~5-66,

R4: State's F.xhibit q).

He transported
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them to the Provo Police Department where he conducted an
investigation of the case (T. 66, 847 State's Exhibit 9).
Prior to questioning, Pierpont advised appellant of her
Miranda rights, which she said she understood (T. 84-8,7
State's Exhibit 18).

Appellant signed a form waiving her

Miranda rights (State's Exhibit 18).
In the conversation with Pierpont, appellant
explained that she and her husband had been having marriage
problems because appellant' husband was not Brandon's
biological father, which was not discovered by her husband
until after their marriage (T. 92, 1117 State's Exhibit 9).
Appellant also said that her family had been having financial
problems, that she had few friends in the area, and that she
was constantly with her chilnren (T. 92, 114-1157 State's
Exhibit 9).

During the last three weeks, appellant was

hitting Brandon and often hit him "harder than I really
expected to" (T. 93, 1177 State's Exhibit 9).

After noticing

bruises on Brandon's back, Rodney Talbot told appellant not to
discipline the child (T. 115-1167 State's Exhibit 9)_.
While the officer taped the conversation, appellant
had the opportunity to agree that the officer was correctly
interpreting her comments (T. 94).

After the conversation was

typed, appellant reviewed the statement to make any deletions
or corrections (T. 94).

Each page of the statement given to

Officer Pierpont was signen and dated by appellant (T. 94:
State's Bxhibit Q).
(T.

The statement was admitted into evinence

95~.
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At trial, appellant said her husband beat Brandon
(T. 112).

On July 11, 1981, Brandon did not want to eat a

piece of toast "and I slapped him.

And after I slapped him

his head his pretty hard on the table" (T. 112).

Under cross-

examination, appellant said her husband warned her about
hitting Brandon (T. 115-116), that she was alarmed with the
force she had used

(T.

llB), that the left temple bruise was

caused after she slapped Brandon, he lost his balance and hit
his head on the side of the tab le ( T. l lt:l).
because she lost her temper

(~.

She slapped him

120).

In a jury trial on November 18-19, 1981, appellant
was found guilty of manslaughter.

After a QQ-day evaluation

by the Utah Division of Corrections, .Judge Allen B. Sorensen
sentenced appellant on February

2~,

lOR2 to one year nor more

than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 4'5, 53-54,
f) 7) •

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS
DELICTI OF' MANSLAUGHTER, WHICH REQUIRES
( l) EV! DENCE OF A DF.ATH OF A HUMAN BEIN";,
AND (2) EVIDRNCE THAT THE DEATH RESULTED

FROM CRIMINAL CONDUCT.
The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, a
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.,
~

76-5-205(l)(a) (1Q53), as amenden, in that appellant, on or
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about July 11, 1981 nid recklessly cause the death of Brandon
Glen Talbot.

Utah Code

Ann.,~~

76-5-201 and 76-5-205(l)(a)

when read together define one theory of manslaughter as where
an actor unlawfully and recklessly causes the death of
another.

Utah Code Ann.,

~

76-7.-103(3) (1953), as amended,

defines recklessly as follows:
A person engages in conduct:
( 3) Recklessly • • • with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unj ustif iab le risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Under this theory of manslaughter, the State was
required to prove:

(1) that appellant acted unlawfully, (2)

that appellant acted recklessly, i.e., was aware of but
consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk
that her conduct would result in the death of Brandon Talbot,
anti ( 3) that appellant caused the death of Brandon Talbot.
The jury found that the State's evidence was sufficient to
establish these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant contenas that the trial court erred in
allowing the police officer to testify about statements
appellant made several days after Brandon was initially
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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treated in the emergency room at Utah valley Hospital.
Appellant alleges that the error occurred when the trial court
admitted these statements before the corpus delicti of
manslaughter had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant's argument also assumes that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction.

These claims are refuted

by the evidence admitteo at trial.
Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the
offense, the existence of a criminal fact without the
existence of which there is nothing to investigate.
Johnson, 95 Utah

~72,

R3 P.2d 1010 (1938).

corpus delicti has two elements:

State v.

The requirement of

(1) that the State present

evidence that the injury specified in the crime occurred, and
(2) that the State present evidence that such injury was
caused by someone's criminal conduct.

State v. Knoefler,

Utah, Sfi) P.2d 175 (197'): State v. Kimbel, Tltah, 620 P.2d 1515
(1980): State v. cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554 (1974).

Thus, the

term corpus delicti in a homicide case involves the fact of
the death ana the fact that death was brought a.l:>out or induced
by a criminal agency.

State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d

1010 (193R).
In the homicide context, the "injury" in the first
part of the corpus delicti definition is the death of a human
being.

State v. Petree, Utah,

P.2d

filed Fehruary 4, 1983): State v. Pyle,

(Case No. 18015,
53~

P.2d 1309 (Kan.
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.

-

1975): State v. Smith, 531 P.2d 843 (Wash. Ct.
People v. Brechon, 390

~.E.~d

~pp.

1975):

626 (Ill. 1979).

For the second requirement, the State need only
present evidence that the death resulted from criminal
conduct, rather than by accident or from natural ca uses.
State v. Petree, supra: Riley v. State, 349 N.E.2d 704 (Ind.
1976): Tanner v. State, 327 So.2d 749 (Ala. Crim

App. 1976).

It is not necessary to show cause of death or to provide
evidence on the specific degree of homicine.
supra.

State v. Petree,

Additionally, contrary to appellant's claims, the

second element does not require that the crime perpetrator's
identity be proven.

State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554

(1974): State v. Johnson, 95 Utah

~72,

Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83 (Del.

83 P.2d 1010 (1938):

19~9).

This Court in

State v. Knoefler, supra, explained the State's burden of
proof in establishing the corpus delicti:
• • • the requirement of independent proof
of the corpus delicti requires only that
the State present evidence that the injury
specified in the crime occurred, and that
such injury was caused by someone's
criminal conduct. An admission or
confession is admissible to connect an
accused with the crime committed, but the
connection of the accused with the crime
need not be proven to establish the corpus
delicti.
563 P.2d at 176 (emphasis .addea).
Other authorities also support the view that the
corpus delicti does not require that the State prove appellant
-12-
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was the guilty party.

Professor McCormick explainen the rule

as follows:
To establish guilt, it is generally
necessary for the prosecution to show that
(a) the injury of harm specified in the
crime occurred, (b) this injury or harm
was caused by someone's criminal activity,
and (c) the defendant was the guilty
party. To sustain a conviction, the
requirement of indepennent proof of the
corpus delicti demands only that the
prosecution have introduced independent
evidence tending to show (a) and (b). It
is not necessary that the independent
proof tend to connect the oefendant with
the crime.

McCormick's Handbook of the Law of F.vidence, E. Cleary,

~

15A

a t p • 3 4; ( 2nd F.d • 19 7 2 ) •
Not all of the elements of the crime neea to be
proven because "otherwise, corpus oelicti would be synonymous
with whole of charge."
(Del. 1979).

Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, at

~6

Corpus delicti does not include all the elements

of the crime1 independent proof of the corpus delicti is a
separate question from that of whether appellant committed the
crime.

State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 2sc; (1941)1

State v. Cazier, Utah,

~21

P.2d 554 ( 1974).

Chesnut, Utah, 621 P.2d 1228

(1~80),

In State v.

this Court stated:

This Court rejected the contention
that the corpus delicti of a crime
inclunes the total proof of all elements
necessary to convict oefendant of the
crime charged in State v. Cazier. This
-13-
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Court explained the traditional and
practically universal concept of the term
"corpus delicti," which means literally
the body of the crime, in regard to proof
of crime, refers only to evidence that the
crime has been committea.
This Court has continually held that the corpus delicti of a
crime does not include proving the appellant's connection with
the crime.
Appellant states that the corpus delicti must be
established "beyond a reasonable doubt."
any supporting case law.

She does not cite

In fact, the standard for proving

the eleMents of the corpus delicti is the lesser standard of
"proof of clear and convincing evidence."

This standard of

proof was established by State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275
P.2d 173 (1954) which stated:
An accused cannot be convicted on his
confession alone. We believe and hold
that in addition there must be
independent, clear and convincing evidence
of the corpus delicti, although we and the
authorities generally do not require it to
be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.

This Court has expressly rejected the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard for proving corpus delicti.

It is generally

agreed that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not be
"beyond a reasonable doubt," "conclusive" or "sufficient to
warrant a conviction."

State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314

p. 2d 3 5 3 ( 19 5 7) •

-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Furthermore, there is no requirement that the corpus
delicti he proved by eyewitnesses.
572, R3 P.2d 1010 (193R).

State v. Johnson, 95 Utah

The two elements of corpus delicti

can he proven by circumstantial evidence.

State v. Petree,

Utah,--~ P.2d --~(Case No. 18015, filed February 4, 1983);

State v. Long, 369 P.2d 247 (Kan. 1962).

The elements can

also be proved by the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
-·

the direct or circumstantial evidence.

State v. Petree,

supra; People v. Ramierez, q1 Cal. App. 3d 132, 153 Cal. Rptr.
789 (Cal. Ct. App. 197Q); People v. Wetzel, 17 Cal. Rptr. 879
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1Q62).

In the present case, it is not

fatal to the State's case that there were no eyewitnesses to
the homicide of Brannon.

The trial judge could review all the

evidence, including the testimony of four physicians, and draw
reasonable inferences to support the conclusion that the
corpus delicti of manslaughter had been established.
These rules of corpus delicti reflect two competing
interests:

(1) to prevent convictions based solely on the

defendant• s statements, and ( /.) the recognition of the
probativeness and evidentiary value of a defendant's
statements after a crime has been committed.
The purpose of the rule was to safeguard
against convicting the innocent on the
strength of false confessions. • • • As a
precaution against convicting the innocent
in the few instances when persons mentally
disturbed or impelled by strange
motivations might confess to crimes they
did not commit.
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Weldon, 6 Utah ?.d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (1957).

At the

same time, because false confessions occur in extremely rare
situations, courts recognize the evidentiary value and
validity of statements, admissions or confessions made by
criminal defendants because of the "natural compunction people
have against confessing to or implicating themselves in
crimes."

State v. Weldon, supra.
The rule (that appellant's statement, by itself,

cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti of the crime
and justify a conviction) should be applied with caution and
not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction to the
administration of justice.

State v. Weldon, supra.

The rule

best suited to the proper administration of justice is that
reasonable minds could believe that the manslaughter of
Brandon Talbot is a real crime which was in fact committed,
and not a crime which was fanciful or imaginary.
A.

Id.

THE CORPUS DELICTI OF MANSLAUr,HTER WAS
SUFFICIP,NTLY ESTARLISHJID BY THE
PROSECUTION BEFORE THE APPELLANT'S
STATEMENTS WERE ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCP..

Appellant argues that the prosecution introduced
appellant's statements before the corpus delicti of the crime
was established.

This is contrary to what happened at trial.

The first element of corpus delicti in a homicide case (the
death of Brandon Talbot) was established by the evidence at
-16-
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the trial.

Dr. Br.ent Gr if fin pronounced Brandon dead on July

13, 1981 at .., a.m. (T. 40).
the child died (T. 21).

nr. Robert Nelson Gray was told

Dr. John Andrews said severe brain

damage caused Brandon's death (T. 62).

Police Officer George

Pierpont investigated Brandon's death (T. 65, 84).
Wallace

~raham

Talbot (T. 72).

nr ...Tohn

performed an autopsy on the body of Brandon
All of this evidence was presented at trial

before George Pierpont testifien to the statements made by
appellant (which is at T. <H-93).
There was also clear and convincing evidence of the
second element of corpus delicti, that the death resulted from
criminal conduct, rather than by accident or from natural
causes.

nr. Robert nray, the emergency roorn physician at Utah

valley Hospital, initially suspected that Brandon had choked
on food, but he rejected an accident as the cause of Brandon's
breathing problems because Brandon did not resume normal
breathing when the pieces of food were suctioned from his
throat (T. 19) because there were multiple head injuries (T.
19), because the acid content in Brandon's blood had remained
normal

(~.

lR), because nr. Gray suspected child abuse (T.

21), and because the doctor's physical examination of Brandon
revealed problems which were not consistent with the
background information provided by appellant (T. 24).
nr. Brent r,riffin also suspected criminal conduct
rather than an accident as the cause of Brandon's death
because the blood gas tests showed that accidental choking was
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not the cause of Brandon's breathing difficulty (T. 34-35).
It is not common to see children with multiple bruises (T.
36-37) and Brannon was suspected to be a victim of child abuse
(T. 36).

He said it would be very unlikely that a child could

receive a severe brain injury from a fall although a bruise is
possible (T. 3R).

He could not explain Brandon's severe brain

injury consistently with the history that had been obtained
from appellant (T. 39) and he would be surprised if the severe
injury was causea by a fall from a chair to a tile floor (T.
40).

His opinion was that Brannon's death was caused by a

blow or blows to the head (T. 40, 44).
Dr. John Andrews• testimony also rejected the
initial explanation of accidental choking.

He suspected

criminal conduct because of the multiple bruises (T. 49), and
because a severe blow to the head would more likely cause the
swelling where the optic nerve enters the back of the eye and
would more likely cause the hemorrhages in Brandon's eyes (T.
49-~0).

He said the brain injury was incompatible with

accidental suffocation (T. 52) and the history given by
appellant was inconsistent with the severity of the brain
damage (T. 53).

Because of the discrepancies between

Brandon's injuries and appellant's explanation of the
injuries, nr. Andrews
syndrome"

(~.

wa~

concerned about "child abuse

59).

Additional evidence of the second element of corpus
delicti was provided by nr. John Wallace Graham, who performen
-18-
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the autopsy.

Re suspected criminal conduct because there were

six bruises on Brandon's head (T.

~s).

The severity of

Brandon's injuries was not consistent with Brandon's falling
from a chair onto a floor {T. 76), and there were too many
injuries to Brandon's head to believe that they were caused
accidentally {T. AO).

Brandon's injuries were consistent with

"Battered Child Syndrome" because different body segments had
bruises, the injuries were of different ages, and the injuries
were not explained adequately through accidental cause {T.
83).

Graham concluded that death was caused by a solid object

striking Brandon's head or Brandon's head being banged against
a solid object (T. 76).
Again, all of this testimony on the second element
of corpus delicti was received before Officer Pierpont
testified about the· statements which appellant made to him
during the investigation.

This testimony, and all reasonable

inferences to be drawn therefrom, provides clear and
convincing evidence of the two elements of corpus delicti.
B.

EVIDENCE THAT ACCIDENT COULD NOT BE
OUT AS THE CAUSE OF THE IRTURIF.S
DOES NOT DESTROY THE CORPUS nELICTI IN
THIS CASE, WHERE Af'l ACCIDENT WAS
EXTREMELY UNLIKP.LY TO CAUSE THE
INJURIES.
RUL~D

Appellant claims throughout her brief that the
evidence showed that Brandon's injuries could have been caused
accidentally, and thus, there was no evidence of any criminal
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agency.

Appellant misinterprets what the physicians actually

said at trial.

Admittedly, some of the testimony was that

accident could not be rulen out with medical certainty as the
cause of Brandon's injuries.

However, this does not destroy

what all of the doctors basically agreed to:

it would be

extremely unlikely that the injuries could have been caused by
an accinent.
Because of appellant's contentions that an accident
was not conclusively ruled out by the physicians as the cause
of Brandon's injuries and, therefore, no criminal conduct was
proven, a thorough review of the evidence on the accident
theory contention is necessary.
Dr. Robe rt r:;ra y had not ruled out child ab use as a
cause of Brandon's injuries (T. ?.l).

Rrandon did not resume

normal breathing when the fooa and vomit were suctioned from
his throat and Dr. Gray rejected an accident as the cause of
Brandon's problems (T. 19).

The doctor's physical examination

of Brandon revealed inconsistencies with the background
information providen by appellant (T. 24).

He could not

determine what caused the death because he had treated Brandon
only in the short time of the emergency situation (T. 22).
nr. nray said one of the bruises would be consistent with a
fall from a chair, but a fall would not explain all of the
bruises (T. 24).

nr. Gray testified that he could not answer

the question whether the injuries coulci have been caused by a
fall from a chair

(~.

2~).
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Dr. Brent Griffin, who first treated Brandon in 1980
for "failure to thrive" shortly before Brandon was taken from
the custody of appellant and placed in a foster home, stated
that the bruises on Brandon's head could have been caused by
any type of blow or fall, and that his concern was that
Brandon was a victim of child abuse (T.

3~).

His belief was

based in part on the multiple bruises Brandon had, which were
not normal for an 18-month-old child (T. 37).

Griffin drew a

distinction between the bruise on the exterior of Brandon's
head ana the severe internal brain injury.

He said it was

possible that the degree of bruising which appeared on the
outside of Brandon's head was consistent with a fall from a
chair to the floor (T. 38).

However, Dr. Griffin qualifien

this general point with reference to the more severe internal
injury:

it would be very unlikely that a child could sustain

a severe brain injury from a fall from a chair to the floor
( T. 38) •
Because of the neurological signs, increased
intercranial pressure, and unresponsiveness to trea_tment, Dr.
r,riffin said that Brandon sustained extremely severe injuries,
much more severe than the accidental falls onto the floor
which young children typically encounter (T. 3q).

The severe

brain injury was inconsistent with the history provided by
appellant that the injuries were accidentally received from a
fal 1 to the floor and he would be "very surprised" if the
injuries had happened by falling from a chair onto a tile
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floor (T. 39-40).

His conclusion was that death resulted from

a blow or blows delivered to Brandon's head.

He did say that

he could not with medical certainty rule out accident as the
cause of the injury (T. 43), but his opinion still remained
that the death was caused by something striking Brandon's head
(T.

44).
Dr. John Andrews said Brandon had suffered extreme

brain damage, "even down into the region of the vital centers
of the brain in the brain stem region" (T. 48).

There were

scattered body and head bruises, and abnormal eye movements,
which indicated that the bruise on Brandon's head was not only
a superficial injury but a deep brain injury (T. 49).

The

injury to Brandon's left temple region was only a few hours
old when he made his examination at 4:30 p.m. on July 11 (T.
61).

He suspected a blow to Brandon's head caused the
bra in injury be ca use eye examinations revealed intercranial
pressure and hemorrhages inside the eyes because of multiple
body bruises ana because of the severe brain injury (T.
50-51).

The history given by appellant did not explain the

severity of the brain damage and the history was also
inconsistent with the death of Brandon (T. 53).

nr. Andrews

said it was unlikely that a fall from a chair to the floor
would cause the severe injuries (T.

s~).

He could not say

that it was impossible for a fall to the floor to cause the
injuries, but a fall would not account for all of Brandon's
-22Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

bruises (T. 57).

Re could not with rnenical certainty rule out

accident as the cause of injury (T.

~2).

However, Dr.

Andrews' main concern was that Brandon may have been abused
because of the discrepancies between the history given by
appellant and the neurological examination, which indicated
purposeful abuse rather than accident (T. 59-60).
Dr. John Wallace Graham, a state medical examiner,
said the cause of death was a head injury which resulted in
external bruising, a bilateral subdural hematoma and severe
brain swelling (T. 75).

The most serious and fatal injury was

the one on the left side of Brandon's head, which was mainly
an internal injury (T. 75).

The other bruises may have

contributed to the internal damage (T. 76).

He said the

injuries to Brandon's head were too severe to be consistent
with a fall from one of the chairs (T. 77).

His conclusion

was that a solid object struck Brandon's head or his head was
banged against a solid object

(T.

76, 80).

Appellant claims, but does not cite to the
transcript to support her claims, that nr. Graham sa·ia the
injuries could have been caused by an accidental fall.
However, Dr. Graham conclusively ruled out accident as the
cause of death (T.

an).

Based on his experience with

homicides of children, he said there were several reasons for
his conclusion, including:
80)7

(1) the severity of the injury (T.

(2) the many bruises (T. 80)7 (3) bruises of different

ages (T. 81) 7 and (4) the injuries were consistent with
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"Battereo Child Syndrome" because there were injuries
involving different body segments, injuries were of different
ages, and the injuries were not adequately explained through
accidental causes (T. 82-83).
A review of the evidence refutes appellant's claims
that the State only proved:
that the life of Brannon Talbot had ended
aue to injuries received to the head which
injuries could have been the result of the
child falling accidentally against a hard
object or a hard object accidentally
hitting the child's head.
(appellant's brief,

7).

It bears repeating that the only

physician, Dr. r,raham, who had the opportunity to view both
the external head injuries and the severe internal brain
injury (therefore in the best position to analyze the
injuries' cause) conclusively stated that an accident could
not have caused Brandon's head injuries or the resulting
death.
The three other physicians (Gray, Griffin and
Andrews) also provided probative evidence on appellant's
contention that Rrandon•s injuries were sustained
accidentally.
was

li~itea,

Each of their medical examinations of Rrando
in general, to a review of only the external

injuries, which din not clearly show the severity of the brain
injuries.

Yet, each of the three doctors agreed that an

accident was unlikely.

The three doctors thus discounted

-24-
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accident while the state medical examiner conclusively ruled
out an accident as the cause of Brandon's injuries.
The doctors' statements that they could not with
medical certainty rule out accident as the cause of Brandon's
death does not destroy the elements of corpus delicti, proven
by clear and convincing evidence by the State before
appellant's statements were admitted into evidence.

Not being

able to rule out accident with medical certainty goes to the
credibility of the doctors as witnesses and what weight should
be given to their testimony by the jury.

It does not make the

evidence insufficient to prove corpus delicti in this case
where accident was very unlikely but could not with medical
certainty be rule0 out by some doctors as the cause of
Brandon's injuries.

Even without the statements by appellant

to Officer Pierpont, the corpus delicti of manslaughter was
shown by clear and convincing evidence.

Appellant's claims,

unsupported by the evidence, that the injuries were caused
accidentally does not destroy the corpus delicti.
Appellant attempts to confuse the proof required to
sustain a conviction with proof

re~uired

for corpus delicti

before appellant's statements may be admitted into evidence.
Appellant cites Bennett v. State, 377 1?.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963),
State v. Thatcher, lOR Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 ( l<l45), and State
v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d

27~,

495 P.2d 318 (1972) for the

proposition that:
-25-
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the State must prove the fact of the
child's death and secondly the State must
prove beyond a reasonable noubt that the
child's death was caused by means of
criminal agency inflicted by the accused.
As discussed supra, the standard for proving corpus delicti in
Utah is proof by clear and convincing evidence.

Also as

discussed supra, the State does not need to show that the
appellant is connected with the criminal conduct as part of
the corpus nelicti.

In addition, appellant's cited cases do

not stand for the proposition that the State must show that
the appellant is connected with the criminal conduct as part.
of the corpus delicti.

Instead, appellant's cases require the

State to show appellant is connected with the criminal conduct
to sustain a conviction.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Bennett, supra, stated
in the homicide of a newborn child that the elements of corpus
delicti, which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
are:

(1) that the infant was born alive and (2) that death

was caused by the criminal agency of the accused.

The case

does not control the present situation because Bennett did not
involve statements made by the defendant.

In addition,

Bennett dealt with sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, and not the required proof of corpus delicti
before the statement of a defendant can be admitted into
evidence.

The Bennett case held that before there can be a

conviction, all elements (including that defendant caused
-2~-
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the criminal act) must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Bennett case followed the general rule that to sustain a
conviction, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
all elements of the crime:

(1) the death of the child: (2)

criminal agency ((1) and (2) are the elements of the corpus
delicti required before admitting a defendant's statements]:
and then (3) the fact that the defendant caused the death.
This is consistent with the case· law in Utah of proof required
to sustain a homicide conviction.
The Wyoming case is correct in requiring that the
corpus delicti be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, along with
the defendant's connection to the crime, before a defendant
can be convicted.

Respondent's reading of Bennett is

supported by the several cases cited by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Bennett.

F.ach case deals with the proof required to

find corpus delicti to sustain a homicide conviction.

People

v. Ryan, 138 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. 1956), and State v. Osmus, 276
P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954) do not discuss corpus delicti required
before a defendant's statements can be admitted into evidence.
Father, in both cases, the contention was that there was
insufficient evidence to convict, i.e., there was insufficient
proof of corpus delicti for the conviction.
Respondent can find no Wyoming cases which support
appellant's contention and apparently the Wyoming Supreme
Court has not confronted the issue of the elements of corpus
delicti required before an appellant's statements can be
admitted into evidence.

Even if there were Wyoming cases
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on this point, they would not control this Court hecause of
the numerous Utah cases, supra, dealing with this contention,
all of which state that appellant need not be connected with
the criminal agency before appellant's statements can be
admitted into evidence.
Appellant cites State v. Bassett, 27 Utah ?.d 272,
495 P.2d 318

(19~2),

claiming that the State cannot convict

appellant for gross negligence or lack of care of Rrandon.

In

that case, this Court said a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter could not be upheld where there was no evidence
to show any criminal act by the defendants, the parents of the
child who had died.

In Bassett, there was no evidence of the

second element of corpus delicti: death caused by someone's
criminal conduct.

There was no evidence of whether the

child's head injuries were caused accidentally or if they were
inflicted otherwise.

An unfortunate death from injuries by a

source not shown in the evidence was simply insufficient to
support the conviction.

For the same reasons, People v.

Strohm, 523 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1974) is distinguishable from the
present case.
The Rassett and Strohm cases are not on point.

In

the case at bar, there was extensive evidence of the second
requirement of corpus delicti, as discussed supra.

Four

physicians testified about the unsuccessful treatment of
Brandon's injuries and the criminal nature of the injuries.
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There was testimony that Brandon was suspected to be a victim
of child abuse.

Brandon was taken from appellant's custody

and placed in a foster home, where he developed normally.
There was evidence that Brandon's injuries were not caused
accidentally.

While there was no evidence of criminal agency

in Bassett, there was clear and convincing evidence of
criminal agency in the present case before appellant's
statements were admitted into evidence.
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258
is also not on point.

(194~)

Thatcher dealt with an involuntary

manslaughter case in which the defendant was attempting to
flee from highway patrol officers when defendant's car drove
into a group of pedestrians, killing two people.

Thatcher

adds nothing to an understanding of the issues in the case at
bar.
Appellant cites State v. Gallegos, 16 tTtah 2d 102,
396 P.2d 414 (19fi4) for the proposition that the State must
prove an intent to kill or do great bodily harm, or do an act
knowing the natural and probable consequence thereof will be
death or great bodily harm.

This case is of questionable

validity because the conviction was based on Utah Code Ann.,

s

76-30-5 (1953), a statute now repealed, which provided for

differing definitions (voluntary and involuntary manslaughter)
of that form of homicide.

The present manslaughter statute

establishes one form of manslaughter, with three separate
theories which will support a conviction.

Utah Code Ann.,
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S 76-!)-205 ( 1953), as amended.

Under the present statute, the

State is not required to prove that appellant knew the natural
or probable consequences of her act would be death.
Respondent submits that independent proof of the
corpus delicti of the manslaughter of Brandon Talbot was shown
by clear and convincing evidence before appellant's statements
were admitted into evidence.

E\7.idence that accident could not

be ruled out as the cause of the injuries does not destroy the
elements of corpus delicti.
C.

THE F.:VIDRNCE WAS SUFFICIEN'I' ~O SUPPORT
TBE JURY'S nETP.RMINATION THAT
APPELLANT WAS GUILTY O:P MANSLAUGHTER.

Appellant's arguments on the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove corpus delicti necessarily incluoe the
contention that there is insufficient evidence to convict
appellant of manslaughter.

Specifically, the claim of

accidental injury to Brandon is an argument that the State did
not provide sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is
well established that it must appear that reasonable minds
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that appellant
committed the crime.
(1977).

State v. Wilson, Utah,

56~

P.2d 66

Unless evidence compels a conclusion that as a matter

of law evidence was inconclusive or so unsatisfactory that
-~0-
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reasonable minds acting fairly must have enterta inen
reasonable doubt that appellant did not commit the crime, the
verdict must be sustained.

State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d

1161 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 :s?.2d 229 (1980); State
v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979); State v. naniels, Utah,
584 P.2d A80 (lq7R); State v. Romero, TJtah, 554 J?.2d 21'5
(1976).
The evidence need not refute contrary allegations
made by appellant if the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence.

State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d ?.29 (lqsn).

The

evidence, and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn
therefrom, is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the
fact finder's verdict.
(197q).

State v. r.,orlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761

A trial court's judgment has a presumption of

validity in an appellate court.

Burton v. Zions Cooperative

Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 259 P.2d 514 (1952).

It

is the exclusive function of the trier of fact and not within
the prerogative of a reviewing court to substitute its
judgment for that of fact finder to determine guilt or
innocence or to substitute its judgment on the weight to give
conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses.
v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d

21~

State

(1976).

The appellate court may not review the sufficiency
of the evidence in cases, like this one, where the fabric of
ev ide nee against the appellant cove rs the gap be tween the
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt.
-31-
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present case, the evidence, stretched to its utMost limits, is
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State in Re '-l.S.H., Utah, 114.2 P.2d 386 (1982) 1 State

v. Kourbela s, TJtah, 621 P. 2d 12 3R ( 19 80).
The standard of review was recently stated in State
v • Mc Ca rd e 11 , Utah ,
August ?.i,

(Case No. 17718, filed

P.2d

1~82):

This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and will only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable man would not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. We also view in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict those
facts which can be reasonably inferred
from the evidence presented to it. "Thus,
intent to commit [a crime] • • • may be
found from proof of facts from which it
reasonably could be believed that such was
defendant's intent." [Citations omitted.]
Accordingly, when the evidence in this case is viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient
evidence to support the guilty verdict.
F.vidence presented by the State established that
Brandon Talbot was taken by appellant to the Utah valley
Hospital at about 1:00 or 1:30 p.rn. on July 11, 1981 (T. 13,
27, 47, 91, 112).

Brandon had previously been placed in a

foster home (T. 97, 1001 State's

Exhibit~),

hut on July 11,

19Rl, Brandon was in appellant's sole custody during the time
-32-
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the injuries were sustained (T. 16, 52, 91, 107, 1127 State's
Exhibit 9).

Brandon was initially treated for suffocation ann

breathing difficulties (T. 17, 27).

Efforts to restore

Brandon's breathing were ineffective (T. lQ,

2~,

52).

Because

of normal acidic content in Rrandon • s blood (T. 18, 28, 14),
because of multiple head injuries (T. 19, 35, 3q, 4R, 51,

~3),

and because the explanation given by appellant was
inconsistent with the severity of Brandon's injuries (T. 24,
39, 53), criminal conduct by the appellant was suspected.
There was also evidence of "Battered Child Syndrome" (T. 59,
83) •

A state medical examiner performen an autopsy and
concluded that the injuries were caused by a solid object
striking Brandon's head or by Brandon's head being banged
against a solid object (T. 76).

The medical examiner

conclusively ruled out accident as an explanation of the
injuries (T. 81) because there were multiple injuries, because
of the different ages of the injuries (T. 81, 83), and because
the most severe injury, which deceptively appeared only as a
superficial bruise on the exterior of Brandon's head (T. 75),
was actually a large swelling of the brain which, in
combination with a bilateral subdural hematorna (T.

7~,

78),

resulted in Brandon's death (T. ?.l, 40, 62, 75).
There was also evidence of "Battered Child
Syndrome," which is evidence that the injuries were not
sustained accidentally.

State v. Loss, 204 N.W.2d 404 (Minn.
-33-
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19~~)1

State v. Periman, 230 S.B.2d 802 (N.r.. Ct. App. 1977)1

United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 19Al).

It has

become an accepted medical and legally qualifed diagnosis.
People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d

~04,

95 Cal. Rptr. 919

(Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
nr. Andrews suspected "Battered Child Syndrome" (T.
59-60) because of the bruises on the head (T. 56), bruises on
the child's back (T. 56), several scattered bruises on the
buttocks ana penis (T. 56-57), and because of the
discrepancies between the medical examination of Brandon and
the explanation of the injuries by appellant

(~.

59-60).

Dr.

Graham said Brandon's injuries were consistent with "Battered
Child Syndrome" because there were bruises on various parts of
Brandon's body, there were injuries of various ages, and the
injuries were not expla inea. adequately and consistently with
those caused by accidents (T. 83).
In addition, there was evidence from a police
officer who talked to appellant the day after Brandon died (T.
84).

Re read the Miranda rights to appellant and she signed a

waiver form (T. 84-85).

After the officer had an account of

the conversation typed, appellant signed this statement after
she had the opportunity to make changes (T. 85, 94).

'!'his

evidence corroborates the testimony of the four doctors.
During tQe conversation, appellant said she was having
marriage problems, financial problems and was constantly with
her two children without having a chance to get out of the
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house (T. 92: State's Exhibit 9).

She said she needed to talk

to someone but had had a difficult time in finding friends (T.
921 State's Exhibit 9).

Because of her frustration and

anxiety toward Brandon, she had been hitting Rrandon during
the three weeks prior to the day Brandon received the fatal
i~juries

(T. 92).

Appellant said no one had hit the child

other than herself (T. 95, 121, 122).
On July 11, 1981, appellant had given Brandon a
piece of toast around 1:30 p.m., but he had a temper tantrum
(T. 92).

Appellant slapped Brandon twice on the head and the

secono hit resulted in Brandon's head hitting the edge of the
table (T. 92).

After she went to adjust the television, she

heard Brandon choking as he fell out of the chair (T. 92).
This testimony is also corroborated by appellant's
testimony at trial.

She said she was having marriage problems

(T. 112), financial problems (T. 114), and having problems
with Brandon (T.

11~).

She argued with her husband over the

amount of force she used in disciplining Brandon (T. 115).
She said that her husband had beaten Brandon on occa-sion (T.
112), but she added that her husband told her to limit her

discipline and not to hit Brandon so hard (T. 116).
Appellant slapped Brandon on July 11, 1981 and "his
head hit pretty hard on the table" (T. 112).

Brandon then

fell out of the chair while she went to the television (T.
112).

She told Officer Pierpont that she hit Brandon harder

than she intended to hit him (T. llR).

She was alarmed that
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Brandon's head hit the table so hard (T. 118).

She said the

bruise over Brandon's left temple area was caused "after I
slapped him he lost his balance and hit his head on this side
of the table" (T. 119).

She said she slapped Brandon because

she was mad (T. 120).
From all of the evidence pesented, the jury fairly
and reasonably could conclude that appellant recklessly caused
the death of Brandon Talbot.

This Court should not disturb

that finding.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS WF.RE PROPERLY
INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE APPELT.ANT
WAIVED HBR MIRANDA RIGHTS AND BECAUSE SHE
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CHANf;ES IN THE
WRITTBN STA~EMENT BEFORE SIGNING IT.
ADMI~TEn

Appellant complains that her statements were
improperly admitted into evidence because the State had not
independently established the corpus delicti of manslaughter.
Appellant contends that no corpus delicti had been proven
because the injuries could have been caused accidentally and
contends that the appellant's statements were improperly
admitted to prove corpus delicti.

Appellant also argues that

even with the statements, there is not sufficient evinence to
prove criminal agency (appellant's brief, 12-13).
Appellant's Point II is similar to her first
contention.

Appellant claims that the State proved corpus
-36-
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delicti of manslaughter only because appellant's statements
were admitted into evidence.

However, as discussed in Point

I, supra, the evidence of corpus delicti even without
appellant's confession and admissions was sufficient.
neorge Pierpont, a Provo City police officer, talked
to physicians at Utah Valley Hospital about Brandon's death
(T.

~5,

83).

He then went to appellant's residence and later

interviewed appellant and her husband at the Provo City Police
Department (T. 84).

He advised appellant of her Miranda

rights (T. 84-85)1 appellant said she understood the rights
(T. 85)

1

appellant read the document, State's Exhibit 18 (T.

85): and she signed the waiver form in the officer's presence
(T. 85).

Appellant and Pierpont cooperated in making a

tape-recorded account of the conversation (T. 94).

As

Pierpont recorded the conversation, appellant had the
opportunity to review the account as it was recorded to make
any corrections (T. 94).

After the statement was typed,

appellant again had the opportunity to make changes (T. 94).
Appellant then signed each of the three pages of the statement
(T. 94: State's Bxhibit Q).
Under these circumstances, appellant does not
challenge the voluntariness of her statements to Officer
Pierpont or clairn that the statements were the product of
coercion by the police officer.

Appellant's confession2

2A confession admits the commission of a crime1
that is, admits all the elements of the crime including guilty
participation. An admission, on the other hand, admits only
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could not be argued to be either.

Respondent submits that

appellant's confessions can be admitted into evidence when the
confession is independently corroborated at some point in the
trial.
In Utah, an admission or a confession, without some
independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti,
cannot alone support a guilty verdict.

State v. Knoefler,

Utah, 563 P.2d 175 (1977)1 State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554
(1974); State v. Jessup, 98 Utah 482, 100 P.2d 969 (1970).

on the other hand, when the corpus delicti has been
established by independent evidence at trial, the confession
of appellant can be used to connect appellant to the crime.
State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554 (1974); State v. Erwin,
101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1942); State v. Jessup, 98 Utah
482, 100 P.?.d 969 (197n); State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372,

some part or elements of the crime, but not the guilt, and
leaves the rest, including participation, to be proved by
other evidence. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010
(193~).
Appellant sa1a to the police officer:
"I remember hitting him on the head on at
least two occasions and on the second
occasion he then struck his head on the
edge of the kitchen tab le and started to
er y. I was alarmed at that time be ca use
he struck his head so hard on the kitchen
table."
(State's Exhibit 9; T. 93). This is a confession and is
corroborated by appellant's direct testimony (T. 112) and
testimony on cross-examination (T. 118). These statements
confess to the manslaughter, recklessly causing the death of
Brandon Talbot.
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314 P.2d J!13 (1957).

In State v. Knoefler, ntah, c;f;3 P.2d 1'5

(1977), the defendant was convicted of drivinq under the

influence of intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury on
another.

The evidence showed that defendant and two other

persons were injured when the car in which they were riding
overturned.

Beer was found near the wreckage and defendant

was staggering, was slurring his· speech and smelled of
alcohol.

At the scene, defendant admitted he was the driver

of the car.

The Court said:

An admission or confession is admissible
to connect an accused with the crime
committed, but the connection of the
accused with the crime need not be proven
to establish the corpus delicti. The
defendant's conviction is not subject to
reversal since his admission was
corrohora tea by independent evidence that
a crime had occurred. The effect of the
defendant's admission was to connect him
to the crime, and his admission was not
needed to es tab li sh that a crime had been
committed.

5 63 P. ?.d at 17 6.
In the present case, appellant's confession was not
neened to establish corpus delicti.

The testimony of corpus

delicti was admitted before appellant's confession and thus
the confession was properly admitted into evidence.

When the

confession was properly admitted, it connected appellant to
the crime and supported the conviction.

-39-
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POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ACTED PROP~RLY BY DENVINr,
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
Appellant alleges prejudicial error in the
prosecutor's presentation of opening arguments to the jury.
She claims that the words "death blow" were highly
inflammatory, and unduly and unfairly prejudicea the jury.
During the prosecutor's opening statement to the
jury, he said:
The tragedy of the case lies, not only in
the fact that the child was so young, but
that the death blow was delivered by the
child's mother, the defendant in this
particular case.
(T. 7).

nefense counsel objected and an off-the-record

discussion was held by the trial judge with the prosecutor and
the defense counsel.

The prosecutor then continued with his

opening statement:
Now the evidence will be as follows:
That
the defendant struck her little child in
the head~ that the death blow was struck
on July 11, 1981, the second Saturday of
July.
(T. 7).

Defense counsel did not object to the use of the

words "death blow" at this point.

Later, defense counsel made

a motion for a mistrial based upon the opening argument of the
prosecutor (T. 9-10).

The trial judge denied the motion (T.

11).
-40-
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Appellant also claims that the prosecution used the
words "death blow" and "words of that kind" during the course
of the trial.

Appellant does not refer to any part of the

record other than the sections relating to the prosecutor.• s
opening statement to support this claim.

Defense counsel

renewed the motion for a mistrial after the State had rested
(T. 102) and also made a motion-· to dismiss the information
because:
The evidence adduced at trial is evi~ence
of intentional acts of the defendant and
that tends to prove another crime, Your
Honor, which is the crime of murder in the
second degree. • • • There is no evidence
of manslaughter. There is no evidence of
recklessly causing the death of the child.
(T. 103).

The motions were denied (T. 104).
Appellant's contentions are without merit because:

(1) the opening arguments by the prosecutor were accurate
comments upon the evidence later presented at trial; (2) the
opening arguments were not prejudicial and inflammatory but
accurate descriptions of what happened to Brandon Talbot; and
(3) the jury was instructed that statements by counsel are not
evidence and must be given no significance where the
statements have no basis in the evidence (R. 35).
A review of the prosecutor's opening arguments
reveals that he was simply commenting upon the evidence he
would present at trial.

Respondent agrees with appellant
-41-
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that the prosecution cannot use improper methods of securing a
conviction and that the prosecutor cannot preaicate his
opening arguments on his knowledge, as was held in People v.
Purvis, 384 P.2d 424 (Cal. 1963), cited in appellant's brief.
People v. Lyons, 303 P.2d 329 (Cal. l95fi) is also not
applicable to the present facts because there the district
-

attorney improperly referred to _.a prior conviction of
__

7

defendant on cross-examination before the defendant had
testified in his own behalf.
An

opening statement in a criminal case is an

outline of facts which the prosecution in good faith expects
to prove.
1981).

People v. Roberts, 4 26

N. E.

2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct.

An opening statement merely provides an opportunity

for counsel to advise the jury of the facts and questions
before them.

State v. Simpson, 641 P.2d 32n (Hawaii

People v. Ramos,

639

P.2d

90R

(Cal. 1982).

l~R2);

Where an opening

argument closely follows the evidence introduced later, there
can be no error.

State v. Wilson,

62~

P.2d 998 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1981).
The purpose of an opening argument is to advise the
jury of the facts relied upon and of the questions and issues,
and to give the jury a general picture of the facts so that
they will be able to understand the evidence.
101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).

State v. Erwin,

Generally, counsel should

be al lowea considerable la ti tu de and make a fair statement of
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the evidence.

In Erwin, the Court sa ia:

• • • and the extent to which he may go is
largely in the discretion of the trial
court. He should not make a statement of
any facts which he cannot legally prove
upon the trial~ nor should he argue the
merits of his case, or relate the
testimony at length.
Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313.

The prosecutor in his opening

arguments must refrain from stating facts (such as defendant's
criminal record) which he will not be permitted to prove
during the presentation of the State's case in chief.

Garner

v. State, 374 P.2d 525 (Nev. 1C)62).
In State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422
(1973), the Court examined the closing arguments of the
prosecutor to the jury and held that there was no error where
the final argument was within the range of reasonable
inferences which could be drawn from the evidence.

The Valdez

Court's explanation of closing arguments seems appropriate for
opening arguments as well:
The test of whether the reMarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the
jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks. The
determination of whether the improper
remarks have influenced a verdict is
within the sound discretion of the trial
court on motion for a new trial. If there
-43-
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be no abuse of this oiscretion ana
substantial justice appears to have been
done, the appellate court will not reverse
the judgment.
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426.
Under the Valdez test, the prosecutor did not call
to the attention of the jurors in the instant case matters
which they would not be justified in considering to oetermine
the appellant's guilt.
case were:

Three elements of manslaughter in this

(1) the death of Brandon Talbot, (2) caused by

blows to his head, (3) which were delivered by appellant.

The

prosecutor in his opening argument made a common sense
observation of the facts which he later did in fact enter into
evidence.

It was a common sense observation that the jurors

could consider:

blows to Rrandon's head nelivered by

appellant caused his death.

The prosecutor outlined these

elements for the jury and told the jury that he would present
evinence on these elements at the trial (T. 7).
The prosecutor did not say or insinuate that the
opening argument was based on his personal knowledge_ or on
anything other than the testimony which was presented shortly
after, during the trial.

The prosecutor did not indicate his

personal opinion of appellant's guilt.

In his outline of the

case, it is difficult to imagine how the prosecutor could
explain his evidence without talking about (1) death (2) blows
to Brandon's head or (3) appellant as the criminal actor.
-44-
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In

homicide cases, the prosecution has always heen allowed in
opening arguments to talk about death, how it was caused and
that the defendant allegedly did the act.

There was nothi.ng

improper with the opening arguments of the prosecutor, and all
of his arguments were based on legally admissible evidence,
which was in fact presented to the jury.
Moreover, the determination whether improper
remarks, if any, of the prosecutor during opening arguments to
the jury have influenced a verdict lies within the discretion
of the trial court.
P.2d 530 (1973).

State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514

Also, note 6, State v. Vigil, Utah,

(Case No. 1Rll8, filed March 18, lq83).

P.2d

If there is

no abuse -of discretion and substantial justice appears to have
been done, the appellate court will not reverse the judgment.
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973).
Appellant has not shown that she was prejudiced by
the prosecutor's words "death blow," which accurately describe
the injuries to Brandon Talhot.

A simple finding of guilt

without appellant showing prejudice in the jury's reaching its
verdict is not, by itself, grounds for reversal.

Appellant

has not shown that the words have improperly influenced the
jurors' minds as to the guilt of appellant.

There is no

showing that the words "death blow" were the sole basis for
the guilty verdict or that the jury would have decided
otherwise if the words had not been used.

The prosecutor

should be allowed to use words in his opening argument which
the jurors will use later in their deliberations.
(

-45-
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There was no pr ej ud ice to appellant which would
support grounds for reversal.
supported by the evidence.

The opening arguments were

The evidence was clear and

decisive, and the trial court's judgment should be upheld,
notwithstanding any alleged misconduct by the prosecutor (two
references to "death blow") or the trial judge (denying a
motion to dismiss).

Respondent submits that there was no

error by the prosecutor or the trial judge, hut if there was
an error, this Court should find that it was harmless in the
context of the evidence, which was sufficient to sustain a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Patter son, Utah,

State v.

(Case No. 17610, filed

November 5, 19 82) •
Furthermore, the trial judge instructed the jurors
that statements by the prosecutor or the defense counsel were
not evidence.

Instruction Number 3 said, in part:

Statements, arguments, and remarks of
counsel are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and in applying
the law, but they are not evidence. You
should disregard any such utterance that
has no basis in the evidence.
(R. 35).

The jurors were expressly told to reject arguments

of counsel, unless the arguments were supported by the
evidence.

The trial judge instructed the jurors that they

should not consider the opening argument as evidence.
Additionally, the trial judge instructed them to disregard the
arguments which were incompetent, i.e., not supported by the
evidence.
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Respondent urges that any alleged prejudicial error
did not result from the prosecutor's opening argument where
the jury was given a cautionary instruction and the evidence
supported, directly and by inference, the appellant's
conviction for the manslaughter of Brandon Talbot, who (1)
died (2) from blows to the head (3) which were delivered by
appellant.

All elements outlined in the prosecutor's opening

argument were properly placed in evidence.
CONCLUSION
The prosectuion presented sufficient evidence on the
two requirements of corpus delicti:

(1) death of a human

being and (2) that the death resulted from criminal conduct.
When the corpus delicti was established by independent proof,
the confession of appellant was properly admitted into
evidence to connect appellant with the crime.

There was also

sufficient evidence to sustain the manslaughter conviction and
to sustain the court's finding that appellant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant's confession was properly admitted into
evidence because she waived her Miranda rights and because she
had an opportunity to make changes in the written statement
before signing it.
The prosecutor's use of the words "death blow" in
his opening argument was not prejudicial, but was an accurate
description of the properly admitted evidence.
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Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the
conviction and sentence of appellant be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this
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of April,

1983.
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